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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
BRENT R. BROOKS 
Defendant/Appellants 
Case No. 920472-CA 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, and pursuant to Rule 26 of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged in Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, of: 
Count I--Distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance to a 
minor, Count II--Possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, Count I l l -
Unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, Count IV-Driving while under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs, and Count V-Trespassing. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all 
evidence obtained by the arresting officer which was denied. Prior to trial, Counts III and V 
were dismissed by the State. After a trial by jury, Defendant was found guilty of Count I 
and IV. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether all evidence obtained by Officer Hendrickson should be suppressed because 
of an unreasonable stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
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Constitution, and a stop made outside the officers jurisdiction in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 77-9-3, (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 20, 1992, at approximately 12:50 a.m., Defendant's pickup truck was 
observed in a park by Officer Hendrickson of the city of Orem Department of Public Safety. 
The park is accessible from the Lindon Marina and a public road through a gate that is kept 
locked. The park and marina are located within the city limits of Lindon, and are therefore 
within the jurisdiction of the Pleasant Grove Public Safety Department. Officer Hendrickson 
observed a light flicker three or four times in the cab of the truck which allegedly suggested 
to him that some kind of drug activity was going on. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, at 17, 
June 18, 1992). Officer Hendrickson also allegedly believed that Defendant may have been 
trespassing because of the enclosed nature of the park. Icl at 20. 
Officer Hendrickson walked part way into the park to investigate and after falling into 
some water, he returned to his car and waited for Defendant to exit the park. Before the 
Defendant left Lindon Marina, Officer Hendrickson instituted a stop utilizing his "brake 
lights, my take down lights, along with my overheads." Id. After approaching the vehicle, 
Officer Hendrickson allegedly smelled marijuana, and a subsequent search revealed a baggie 
of marijuana and other paraphernalia. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Officer Hendrickson's justification for the stop was unreasonable. In order for a stop 
to be valid, an officer must have an articulable suspicion to stop and detain a suspect. The 
suspicions articulated by Officer Hendrickson in the present case of observing a truck in a 
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park and flickering lights inside the truck are not sufficient to warrant a stop. Such suspicion 
may warrant an investigatory inquiry, but not a detention against the will of the suspect. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In regards to the findings of fact of the trial court the appropriate Standard of Review 
is clearly erroneous. Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991). "However, as for the trial court's legal 
conclusions in regards thereto, the correction of error standard applies." Warden, 844 P.2d 
at 362 (quoting Steward, 806 P.2d at 215). 
II. OFFICER HENDRICKSON STOPPED AND DETAINED DEFENDANT 
AGAINST HIS WILL WITHOUT HAVING AN ARTICULABLE 
REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
Public Safety Officers typically engage in three levels of encounters with citizens: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" 
that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 
"detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe 
an offense has been committed. 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted). The stop in question in the 
present case is a level two stop because the officer activated his over-head lights and 
therefore demanded that Defendant stop his vehicle. Officer Hendrickson stated his suspicion 
as being a totality of the circumstances when he observed Defendants in the park late at 
night, and saw lights flickering. However, neither one of these circumstances alone, nor the 
3 
combination of the circumstances gives rise to an articulable suspicion that criminal activity 
was present. 
Officer Hendrickson observed Defendant leave the park on a road which exited to the 
Lindon Marina, and subsequently instigated the stop. Therefore, the park was obviously not 
enclosed as Officer Hendrickson indicated. Suppression Hearing Transcript at 20. Since the 
enclosed nature of the park was the officer's articulated justification for believing that 
Defendant was trespassing, and the officer actually observed Defendant drive out of the park 
and exit into the marina, his articulated suspicion of trespassing and vandalism is 
unreasonable. 
The second articulated suspicion for the stop was the event of observing flickering 
lights in the truck. The presence of flickering lights could certainly be explained by any one 
of a number of circumstances: three or four people lighting a cigarette, three or four people 
having a conversation with lighted cigarettes while turning their heads so the lighted part of 
the cigarettes alternate from positions within and without the view of an observer who is a 
significant distance away, etc. The possibility of the flickering lights fitting a profile of 
smoking marijuana is not sufficient, standing alone, to warrant a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to make a stop. 
Additionally, the summation of two circumstances which do not amount to a 
reasonable suspicion individually in order to achieve reasonable suspicion under the totality 
of the circumstances is not appropriate in the present case. The two articulated suspicions of 
trespassing and drug use are unrelated to each other and therefore the presence of reasonable 
suspicion should not be bolstered by considering the two together. In State v. Arroyo, 796 
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P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) the Utah Supreme Court held that an officers initial stop based on the 
suspect vehicle following too close was a pretext, and the evidence should be suppressed. See 
also. State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1992) (nervous and evasive behavior of 
driver, cluttered condition of car, and bloodshot eyes of driver and passenger did not 
constitute reasonable suspicion to further detain defendants); But see State v. Aquilar, 758 
P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1988) (following too close to another vehicle and drifting towards the 
white line marking the emergency lane was sufficient to warrant reasonable suspicion to stop 
and detain a driver for suspicion of driving while under the influence). In the case at bar, 
Officer Hendrickson did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop, and the evidence 
which was found as a result of the detention must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous 
tree. 
III. OFFICER HENDRICKSON WAS OUT OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE 
OBSERVED DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. §77-9-3. 
Under normal circumstances, an officer only has authority to act as a peace officer in 
his official capacity within his jurisdiction. 
77-9-3 Authority of peace officer of this state beyond normal jurisdiction. 
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any governmental entity of this state 
may exercise a peace officer's authority beyond the limits of such officer's 
normal jurisdiction as follows: 
(a) When in fresh pursuit of an offender for the purpose of arresting and 
holding that person in custody or returning the suspect to the jurisdiction 
where the offense was committed; 
(b) When a public offense is committed in such officer's presence; 
(c) When participating in an investigation of criminal activity which originated 
in such officer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation with the local authority; 
(d) When called to assist peace officers of another jurisdiction. 
(2) Any peace officer, prior to taking such authorized action, shall notify and 
receive approval of the local law enforcement authority, or if such prior 
contact is not reasonably possible, notify the local law enforcement authority 
as soon as reasonably possible. Unless specifically requested to aid a police 
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officer of another jurisdiction or otherwise as provided for by law, no legal 
responsibility for a police officer's action outside his normal jurisdiction and as 
provided herein, shall attach to the local law enforcement authority. 
U.C.A. §77-9-3 (1953 as amended). Officer Hendrickson and the State admit that the officer 
was out of his jurisdiction when he observed the allegedly suspicious activity and made the 
stop. Suppression Hearing Transcript at 24. This Court must determine whether the officer's 
actions were justified under U.C.A. §77-9-3. Even if this Court should find that the officer 
was justified in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction under subsection one of Section 77-9-3, 
the officer admitted that he did not follow the procedures required in subsection two. Not 
only did Officer Hendrickson fail to notify the proper authorities of his out-of-jurisdiction 
action, but he had never done so in the past. Suppression Hearing Transcript at 25-26. 
Since the officer has admitted that he was out of his jurisdiction and that he did not 
follow proper procedures for acting outside of his jurisdiction, this Court must determine 
what remedy is appropriate. In State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered a similar issue. The Court cited a test to consider when 
determining the remedy when a non-constitutional rule has been violated by a police officer: 
Only a "fundamental" violation of [a rule of criminal procedure] requires 
automatic suppression, and a violation is "fundamental" only where it, in 
effect, renders the search unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment 
standards. Where the alleged violation. . . is not "fundamental" suppression is 
required only where: 
(1) there was "prejudice" in the sense that the search might not have occurred 
or would not have been so abrasive if the [r]ule had been followed, or (2) 
there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision of the 
[r]ule. . . . 
IcL at 1368 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mason. 490 A.2d 421 (Pa. 1985). In the present 
case, Defendant was substantially prejudiced by the officer's actions outside of his 
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jurisdiction. If the officer had not been acting beyond the scope of his authority, the 
encounter would never have occurred and Defendant would not have been charged in the 
case at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
As for the issue of the officer acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction, Defense 
counsel believes that the evidence obtained by the officer as a result of his violating the 
statute should be suppressed. Counsel believes that Defendant was substantially prejudiced 
by the officer's actions. But see Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369 (held that even though an under-
cover officer was clearly acting outside his jurisdictional boundaries and did not follow 
proper procedures to authorize such conduct, it was not necessary to suppress the evidence 
found as a result of the officers violation of the rule). Based on the foregoing, Defendant 
respectfully requests the court to find that officer Hendrickson did not have a reasonable 
articulable suspicion to stop Defendant, and all evidence found as a result of that stop must 
be supressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 






IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
*********** 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRENT RAY BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER: 921400255 
DATE: September 9, 1992 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
Rept: Vonda Bassett, CSR 
************ 
JURY TRIAL 
This matter came before the Court for a criminal jury 
trial. The State appeared by and through Deputy County Attorney 
John Allen. The defendant was present and represented by Cleve 
Hatch. 
The jurors were sworn and qualified for the term. The 
jurors were sworn and seated by the bailiff as follows: 
I. Chad Brown 
3. Nanalee Stratton 
5. Kevin Stephenson 
7. Gloria Hatfield 
9. Thomas Gruwell 
II. Theron Kuhni 
13. Wayne Rogers 
15. Dave John 
17. Richard Tolton 
19. Vaness Jolley 
21. Howard Hatch (excused for cause) 
23. Larry Nash 
2. Vern Spiers 
4. Duncan Tharp 
6. Jolynn Jordan 
8. Robert Howard 
10. Wendy Winger 
12. Karolyn Teuscher 
14. David Montoya 
16. Diane Child 
18. Todd Ashton 
20. Marie Marchant 
22. Diana Cazier 
Robert Wilson was excused for medical reasons. 
The jury was passed for cause. Peremptory challenges 
were taken and the following were chose to serve as jurors and 
were sworn as follows: 
1. Chad Brown 
2. Vern Spiers 
3. Nanalee Stratton 
4• Kevin Stephenson 
5. Gloria Hatfield 
6. Wendy Winger 
7. Karolyn Teuscher 
8. Wayne Rogers 
The Court gave the jurors the cautionary admonition and 
recessed for the noon recess. 
Upon returning to the courtroom, the jurors were seated, 
counsel and parties present and ready to proceed. 
The Court envoked the exclusionary rule for witness' to wait 
outside the courtroom until called to testify. 
Counsel gave opening statements. 
Officer Kris Hendrickson was sworn and testified on direct 
by Mr. Allen. Exhibit's 1-8, were offered and received. Cross by Mr. 
Hatch. Exhibit's 9-11, were offered and received. 
Jeffrey Carter was sworn and testified on direct by Mr. 
Allen. Cross by Mr. Hatch. Redirect by Mr. Allen. 
Officer Steve Swenson was sworn and testified on direct by 
Mr. Allen. Cross by Mr. Hatch. 
Officer Keller was sworn and testified on direct by Mr. 
Allen. Cross by Mr. Hatch. Redirect by Mr. Allen. Exhibit 12 was 
marked but not received. Exhibit 13, was offered and received. 
Jeffrey Carter was recalled to testify by Mr. Hatch. Cross 
by Mr. Allen. Redirect by Mr. Hatch. 
Norm Castle was sworn and testified on direct by Mr. Hatch. 
Cross was given by Mr. Allen. 
The Court will recess until August 4, 1992. 
AUGUST 4, 1992 
Court resumed session with the jury seated, counsel and 
parties present and ready to proceed. 
Vanetta Brooks was sworn and testified on direct by Mr. 
Hatch. No cross was given by Mr. Allen. 
Barbara Hensley was sworn and testified on direct by Mr. 
Hatch. Cross by Mr. Allen. 
Robert Rothwell's testimony was proffered by Mr. Hatch. Mr. 
Allen agreed with the proffered testimony. 
The defense rested. Mr. Hatch made a motion to suppress. 
The Court will hear the motion upon completion of all testimony out of 
the presence of the jury. 
Officer Keller was recalled on rebuttal by Mr. Allen. Cross 
by Mr. Hatch. The jury was excused. 
Mr. Hatch addressed the motion to suppress the issue of 
trespassing. The State responded. 
The Court finds after hearing all the evidence in its 
totality, finds the officer had probable cause to make the vehicle 
stop and will deny the motion to suppress. 
The Court reviewed the jury instructions with counsel. 
Upon returning to the courtroom, the jury was seated, 
counsel and parties were present and ready to proceed. 
The Court instructed the jury and counsel gave closing 
arguments. Rebuttal given by Mr. Allen. 
The bailiff was sworn and the jury deliberated at 12:35 p.m. 
The jury returned from deliberation at 3:00 p.m. 
The defendant was found guilty to Counts I, Distribution of 
or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance to a Minor, A Second 
Degree Felony, IV, Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or 
Drugs, a Class B Misdemeanor. The defendant was found not guilty to 
Count II, Possession of a Dagerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a 
Third Degree Felony. The Court dismissed Count II. 
The defendant stated in court he wishes to waive the 
statutory time to be sentenced and requested sentencing to take place 
this day. 
The defendant having been found guilty by a jury this day of 
the offense in Count I, Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance to a Minor, a Second Degree Felony, and Count IV, 
Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, being now present in court and represented by counsel, 
and there being no legal reason why sentence should not be imposed, is 
hereby sentenced as follows: 
SENTENCE 
As to Count I, the defendant is to be confined in the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term not less than one (1) but not 
to exceed (15) years. As to Count IV, the defendant is to be confined 
in the Utah County Jail for a term not to exceed six (6) months. Said 
sentences are to run concurrently with eachother. 
Mr, Hatch moved the Court to have today's sentence run 
concurrently with any sentence now serving. Mr. Allen objected. 
The Court orders the sentence pronounced this day to run 
consecutively with anyother sentence now serving. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Pursuant to Utah code Annotated 77-27-13(5) the Court 
provides the following information: 
(1) The Court is of the opinion that the defendant should 
be imposed for a term presceibed by the Utah Sentence and Release 
Guidelines. 
(2) The Court has no information regarding the character of 
the defendant or any mitigating or agrravating circumstance connected 
with the offense for which the defenant was convicted other than that 
which was stated in court. 
Dated this 9th day of September, 1992. 
BY 
cc: Carlyle K. Bryson, Esq. 
Cleve Hatch, Esq. 
Adult Probation & Parole 
Utah State Prison 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellate Brief, postage 
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